How Lula’s Comeback Saved BRICS From Quietly Falling Apart

How Lula’s Comeback Saved BRICS From Quietly Falling Apart

Beijing and Moscow didn't pop champagne publicly in October 2022, but the relief inside their foreign ministries was unmistakable.

When Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva edged out Jair Bolsonaro by less than two percentage points in Brazil's runoff election, he didn't just flip South America's biggest economy back to the political left. He rescued the entire BRICS bloc from a slow, agonizing irrelevance. Most Western analysts treated that election as a domestic referendum on Amazon deforestation or pandemic mismanagement. They missed the bigger geopolitical story entirely.

If Bolsonaro had won a second term, the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa coalition would have lost its only credible bridge to the Global South outside Eurasia.

Why Diplomats in Beijing and Moscow Were Sweating

You have to look at how awkward BRICS summits had become between 2019 and 2022 to understand why Lula’s victory mattered so much.

Bolsonaro spent his early presidency actively trying to align Brazil with Washington. He attacked China repeatedly during his 2018 campaign, accusing Beijing of trying to "buy Brazil," and his cabinet ministers openly mocked Chinese officials during the COVID-19 pandemic. Even when agribusiness pressure forced Bolsonaro to soften his tone toward Brazil's largest trading partner, the ideological trust was gone. He treated BRICS like an annoying club membership he couldn't quite cancel without hurting soybean exports.

That left the bloc lopsided.

Without an enthusiastic Brazil, BRICS risked looking like an anti-Western grievance group dominated entirely by Beijing and Moscow. India was already hedging its bets through the Quad security dialogue with the United States, Japan, and Australia. South Africa lacked the economic heft to balance the room on its own. BRICS desperately needed a democratic, non-aligned heavyweight in the Western Hemisphere to prove it wasn't just an authoritarian echo chamber.

Lula walked back into the Planalto Palace and immediately gave them that legitimacy. Remember, he was one of the original architects who helped turn Jim O'Neill's 2001 Goldman Sachs investment acronym into an actual diplomatic institution back in 2009. For Lula, multipolarity isn't a talking point. It's the core thesis of his foreign policy.

The Dollar Problem Nobody Wants to Admit

Talk to anyone watching emerging market central banks, and you'll hear the same debate over and over. Can BRICS actually challenge the U.S. dollar?

Honestly, the headlines get way ahead of reality here. Whenever Lula stands at a podium in Shanghai or Johannesburg and asks why countries have to trade in dollars instead of their own currencies, financial Twitter loses its mind. You start seeing breathless predictions about an imminent "BRICS currency" backed by gold that will crash the greenback overnight.

Let's be real about how trade finance actually works.

A single shared BRICS currency is a fantasy right now, and central bankers in New Delhi and Pretoria know it. You can't run a monetary union between China's tightly controlled capital account, Russia's sanctioned wartime economy, and Brazil's free-floating real without blowing up somebody's domestic banking system. Even the European Union nearly tore itself apart over the euro, and those economies actually converged before merging.

What Lula did restart, however, is something much quieter and far more practical.

  • Local currency settlement. Brazil and China signed agreements in early 2023 allowing bilateral trade—worth over $150 billion annually—to settle directly in yuan and reais without touching U.S. dollars as an intermediary.
  • Reviving the New Development Bank. Lula installed former Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff as head of the Shanghai-based BRICS bank, turning a sleepy infrastructure lender into an aggressive financing alternative to the World Bank.
  • Dropping Western austerity strings. Unlike International Monetary Fund loans, which usually demand painful domestic spending cuts, BRICS financing comes without political lectures on governance or fiscal orthodoxy.

This isn't about destroying the dollar tomorrow. It's about building bypass roads around Western sanctions and Federal Reserve interest rate hikes. When Washington froze roughly $300 billion of Russia's foreign exchange reserves in 2022, every finance minister in the developing world took notes. Lula gave voice to an anxiety that countries like India and Saudi Arabia felt privately but preferred not to shout into a microphone.

Expansion Changed the Math Forever

If Lula’s return saved BRICS from stagnation, the 2023 Johannesburg summit transformed it into something entirely different.

Before Lula returned to office, Brazil had actually been lukewarm on expanding BRICS membership. Brazilian diplomats worried—rightly, as it turned out—that adding too many new countries would dilute Brazil's influence as the bloc's sole South American voice. Why share a five-seat table if expanding it to ten or eleven makes your vote worth half as much?

China wanted rapid expansion to build a broader geopolitical counterweight to the G7. Russia wanted new friends to prove Western isolation campaigns had failed.

Lula cut a deal. Brazil dropped its objections to expansion in exchange for backing on United Nations Security Council reform and climate finance leadership. By January 2024, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates officially joined the club, with Saudi Arabia hovering in an extended invitation limbo and dozens of other nations lining up outside the door.

Look at what that did to the bloc's balance sheet.

Suddenly, BRICS+ controlled roughly 45 percent of the world's population and more than a third of global GDP measured by purchasing power parity. More importantly, bringing in Gulf oil producers alongside top energy importers like China and India put global crude markets inside a single diplomatic room.

Where Lula’s Strategy Hits a Wall

It's easy to paint Lula's foreign policy as a smooth geopolitical triumph, especially compared to Bolsonaro's erratic diplomacy. That would be a mistake.

Brazil is walking a tightrope that gets thinner every month. By welcoming Iran into BRICS and refusing to send ammunition to Ukraine, Lula irritated Washington and European capitals that had initially celebrated him as a democratic hero saving the Amazon. His attempt to position Brazil as a neutral peace broker in Eastern Europe fell flat when he suggested Ukraine shared blame for the Russian invasion—a comment he later had to walk back after fierce pushback from Kyiv and Brussels.

There is also an uncomfortable economic asymmetry inside BRICS that Brazilian industrialists complain about constantly.

Look at what Brazil actually sells to China versus what it buys back. Brazil exports raw iron ore, crude oil, soybeans, and beef. China sells Brazil electric vehicles, solar panels, telecommunications gear, and manufactured machinery. That looks less like South-South solidarity and more like a classic nineteenth-century colonial trade pattern. Lula's government has already had to slap tariffs back on Chinese electric vehicles and steel imports to protect Brazilian factory workers—the exact same industrial base that votes for his Workers' Party.

You can't build a unified anti-hegemonic front when your biggest partner is hollowing out your domestic manufacturing sector.

Why India Quietly Appreciated Lula’s Return

People always frame BRICS around Beijing and Moscow, which ignores New Delhi's real strategic dilemma.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi has spent years deepening defense ties with the United States because Chinese troops sit aggressively along India's Himalayan border. At the same time, India refuses to join Western sanctions against Russia, its longtime arms supplier, and fiercely guards its strategic autonomy.

During Bolsonaro's presidency, India often felt caught in a three-way squeeze inside BRICS between an assertive China, a cornered Russia, and an indifferent Brazil. Lula's comeback gave Modi a democratic partner who also wanted to keep channels open to both Washington and Beijing without picking a permanent camp.

Brazil and India share remarkably similar instincts here. Neither wants to live in a world run exclusively from Washington, and neither wants to trade American dominance for Chinese hegemony. When Lula pushes for reforming the World Trade Organization or demanding climate compensation from wealthy nations, New Delhi backs him completely. When Beijing pushes too hard to turn BRICS into an overtly anti-American military-adjacent alliance, Brasília and New Delhi quietly pump the brakes together.

What You Should Watch Next

If you're tracking emerging markets, global trade, or geopolitical risk, stop watching the flashy summit photo-ops and pay attention to three concrete indicators over the next year.

First, watch cross-border payment volumes through the New Development Bank. If local-currency lending grows beyond symbolic bilateral deals into routine corporate trade finance, Western banks lose real fee revenue and compliance leverage. Second, track how Brazil manages Chinese industrial competition at home. Every tariff Brasília imposes on Beijing exposes the gap between BRICS diplomatic rhetoric and hard economic self-interest. Finally, keep an eye on the 2026 Brazilian presidential race and successor politics—because as the shift from Bolsonaro to Lula proved, the entire trajectory of Global South alignment still hinges on who sits in Brasília.

BF

Bella Flores

Bella Flores has built a reputation for clear, engaging writing that transforms complex subjects into stories readers can connect with and understand.