Colombia Is Not Fighting Cartels It Is Battling Its Own Economy

Colombia Is Not Fighting Cartels It Is Battling Its Own Economy

Every six months, foreign correspondents descend on Bogotá to write the exact same dispatch. A new leader takes power—whether a right-wing security hawk or a left-wing reformer promising total peace—and immediately faces a wave of violence. The headline is always a variation of the same lazy trope: The gangs testing Colombia’s hardline new leader.

It makes for compelling Hollywood drama. It paints a picture of masked kingpins sitting in jungle compounds, map spread across a mahogany table, sliding chess pieces forward to see how much pressure the commander-in-chief can take before the state cracks.

It is entirely, dangerously false.

The armed groups, cartels, and dissident factions mutating across Colombia’s departments are not "testing" anyone. They are not staging perimeter probes to test the presidential reflexes. They are simply conducting business as usual in a country where illegality is the primary engine of upward mobility. When a new administration steps into Nariño Palace and discovers that coca production is at an all-time high or that extortion has doubled in the Cauca valley, they act surprised. They shouldn't be. They are looking at a market response, not a military provocation.

I have spent years watching policymakers in Washington and Bogotá blow millions of dollars trying to solve a structural economic crisis with tactical policing. I have seen foreign advisors scratch their heads as eradication programs fail for the hundredth time, missing the fundamental truth that for millions of Colombians, the illicit economy is the only welfare state they have ever known. Until we stop treating this as a law enforcement glitch and start recognizing it as a market equilibrium, every administration will fail.

The Lazy Consensus of the Security State

The conventional narrative pushed by think tanks and mainstream media relies on a comforting fiction: that Colombia is a stable, modern democracy periodically hijacked by criminal outliers. If the state just applies enough pressure—through forced eradication, military sweeps, or, conversely, unconditional peace talks—the bad actors will fold.

This view assumes that armed groups operate outside society. In reality, they are deeply integrated into it.

Take the National Liberation Army, known as the ELN, or the sprawling federations emerging from the ashes of the demobilized FARC. Look past the revolutionary rhetoric and the tactical camouflage. What you are looking at is a conglomerate of diversified service providers. They collect taxes on commerce, regulate labor disputes, enforce contracts, provide microloans to smallholders, and protect supply chains. In regions where the government is represented solely by an underfunded mayor's office and a corrupt police detachment, the armed group is the government.

When a president enters office promising a crackdown, these groups do not hunker down in fear. They adjust their margins. They diversify their portfolios into illegal gold mining, migrant smuggling, and local extortion rackets. The idea that they are "testing" the president assumes they care about the president’s approval rating. They don't. They care about freight rates, shipping routes, and municipal budgets.

To understand why every security strategy collapses, you have to look at the math of the ground floor.

The Economics of Extortion as Public Infrastructure

Let us define terms precisely. When economists talk about taxation, they talk about a compulsory contribution to state revenue levied by the government. In large swaths of Colombia, the functional definition remains identical, but the issuer changes.

If you are a cattle rancher in Córdoba or a coca grower in Catatumbo, you pay a tax. You pay the local front of the Clan del Golfo or a dissident faction. In return, you receive something the national government cannot guarantee: security of property and life. If someone steals your cattle, the local commander recovers them and executes the thief. If you need credit to plant your crop, local armed networks provide liquidity that traditional banks—terrified of anti-money laundering regulations—will never touch.

This is why traditional military offensives backfire so predictably. When the military sweeps into a municipality, kills a regional commander, and plants the national flag, they do not liberate the population. They disrupt the local governance structure. Without a functioning state apparatus ready to step in with courts, schools, credit markets, and infrastructure within twenty-four hours, the military's departure creates a vacuum. Within a week, a new armed faction fills the void. The locals do not cheer the army; they resent the disruption to the local economy.

The state views its presence as the arrival of order. The local population often views the state as a destabilizing force that interrupts predictability. Until policymakers grasp this inversion, they will keep fighting ghosts.

The False Binary of Total Peace Versus Iron Fists

For decades, Colombian politics has swung violently between two failed extremes, each championed by successive political factions.

On one side, you have the security hawks who believe that every problem can be solved by dropping more bombs, extraditing more bosses, and spraying more glyphosate over small farms. This approach treats symptoms as causes. You can decapitate every cartel leadership structure in the country, and within six months, ambitious mid-level lieutenants will splinter the organization into three leaner, more violent factions. It is the hydra problem. You cannot police your way out of a market with infinite demand and boundless labor supply.

On the other side, you have the romantic proponents of total peace who believe that armed groups can be folded into civil society through political negotiations and generous legal concessions. This approach assumes that guerrillas and cartels are motivated by political grievances that can be resolved with constitutional reform and agrarian subsidies.

Both sides are selling a fantasy.

The romantic peace model ignores the fact that modern Colombian armed groups are capitalist enterprises. Ideology is a marketing tool; cocaine, extortion, and illegal mining are the balance sheet. When you offer peace terms to organizations whose primary revenue stream depends on criminal governance, you are not negotiating an end to conflict; you are negotiating a corporate merger. You are giving criminal syndicates official political recognition, state-subsidized zones, and impunity, allowing them to institutionalize their monopolies.

The Real Power Centers

If you want to know why criminal networks remain resilient against any administration, stop looking at the jungle camps and start looking at the municipal banks, regional chambers of commerce, and port terminals.

The true vulnerability of these groups is not military; it is financial. Yet, the state chronically underinvests in tracking illicit capital flows through formal financial systems. It is much easier for a defense minister to announce a battalion deployment to the jungle than it is to audit the corrupt notaries, shell companies, and municipal procurement contracts that launder billions of drug dollars into legal real estate and infrastructure projects in Medellín, Cali, and Bogotá.

When armed groups project strength against a new administration, it is rarely an operational test of military might. It is a signaling campaign designed to secure better leverage at the negotiating table or to protect lucrative laundering corridors. Every blockade, every targeted assassination of a local social leader, and every coordinated ambush is a form of lobbying. They are telling the government how much it will cost to maintain the status quo.

And because the state is structurally incapable of replacing the economic services these groups provide, the government usually ends up paying—either in territorial concessions, unmolested trafficking corridors, or blind eyes turned toward local elections.

The Uncomfortable Prescription

If we want to dismantle the cycle of violence in Colombia, we have to abandon the comforting language of "testing leaders" and confront uncomfortable realities.

First, coca eradication must be decoupled from moral crusades and treated as an agricultural transition problem. You cannot eradicate a crop that pays ten times more than any legal alternative without first building roads, cold-chain logistics, and legal banking access that make legal crops commercially viable. Until a farmer can get a bunch of plantains to market before they rot, coca will remain the only rational financial choice.

Second, the state must stop negotiating with criminal syndicates as if they were political insurgents. You do not negotiate peace with transnational trafficking cartels; you dismantle their financial architecture. You target the accountants, the corrupt politicians, the legal front companies, and the international buyers. If you cut off the liquidity, the armies disband themselves because they can no longer pay their payroll.

Third, we must accept that state-building is painfully slow. It cannot be achieved by a presidential decree or a sudden surge of police battalions. It requires boring, bureaucratic, unglamorous work: building local courts, enforcing property rights, rooting out municipal corruption, and establishing a tax base that actually delivers public goods.

The gangs are not testing the leader. They are testing our willingness to look past the political theater and face the structural rot underneath.

Stop waiting for the next grand strategy to fail. Start following the money.

BF

Bella Flores

Bella Flores has built a reputation for clear, engaging writing that transforms complex subjects into stories readers can connect with and understand.